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German crowd-investing platforms: Literature 
review and survey
David Grundy1* and Carolina Ohmer1
Abstract: This article presents a comprehensive overview of the current German 
crowd-investing market drawing on a data-set of 31 crowd-investing platforms 
including the analysis of 265 completed projects. While crowd-investing market still 
only represents a niche in the German venture capital market, there is potential for 
an increase in both market volume and in average project investment. The market 
share is distributed among a few crowd-investing platforms with high entry barriers 
for new platforms although platforms that specialise in certain sectors have man-
aged to successfully enter the market. German crowd-investing platforms are found 
to promote mainly internet-based enterprises (36%) followed by projects in real 
estate (24%) and green projects (19%), with the median money raised 100,000 euro.
Subjects: Entrepreneurial Finance; Entrepreneurship; Small Business Management
Keywords: crowd-investing; crowd-investing platforms; German entrepreneurship
1. Introduction
Entrepreneurial activity is crucial for economic growth (Carree & Thurik, 2010; Wennekers & Thurik, 
1999). This emphasises the importance for economies to encourage entrepreneurial culture and 
provide useful support mechanisms. Entrepreneurs, as founders and owners of businesses, play a 
key role as innovators and initiators of economic development (Carland, Carland, & Hoy, 2002; 
Mohanty, 2005). However, throughout the founding process, entrepreneurs encounter a number of 
di culties including securing inancing sources, for both equity and debt, especially in early stage 
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inancing (Bellelamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014; Macht & Weatherston, 2014). The re-
duced access to external capital, caused for instance by lack of interest from business angels on 
account of too small amounts, often creates a funding gap (Collins & Pierrakis, 2012).
According to Pope (2011), more than 97% of entrepreneurs fail in the attempt to obtain angel 
capital. Additionally, in the aftermath of the inancial crisis it has become increasingly challenging 
for entrepreneurs to acquire bank loans to overcome funding gaps. In recent years however, crowd-
funding has emerged as novel funding source through which entrepreneurs can acquire external 
capital through an open call via internet (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012; Tomczak & Brem, 2013). 
Particularly equity-based crowd-funding, also known as crowd-investing, a subtype of crowd-fund-
ing, has been identiied as conceivable alternative inancing method to other sources of external 
equity (Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012). The current economic environment, where on the one hand en-
trepreneurs are forced to search for new inancing sources, and on the other hand investors demand 
new investment opportunities, due to low interest rates and high market uncertainties, could en-
courage the growth of crowd-investing (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). Consequently, crowd-investing 
could enhance entrepreneurial culture, especially in countries such as Germany where support 
mechanisms for entrepreneurs are still poorly developed (German Startups Association, 2014). In 
this context, crowd-funding platforms, or more speciic, crowd-investing platforms could play a key 
role for the growth of the sector in their function as intermediaries between investors and 
entrepreneurs.
While crowd-investing in general is rapidly growing and evolving, literature in this area is still rela-
tively sparse (Mollick, 2014). Nevertheless, the growing importance of the crowd-funding sector, 
emphasises the necessity of further research in order to contribute to the state of knowledge and 
keep pace with changes of this innovative inancing method. Hence, the objective of this article is to 
provide an overview of the German crowd-investing market and analyse the suitability of crowd-in-
vesting platforms for entrepreneurs. The underlying purpose is thereby to give an account of the 
current status of German crowd-investing to enable a categorisation, and thus a better evaluation 
regarding the potential of crowd-investing as funding source. There are few reports and studies on 
crowd-funding outside of the US. One comprehensive report on crowd-funding in relevant European 
countries, including Germany, was conducted by Ernst and Young on behalf of the University of 
Cambridge (Wardrop, Zhang, Rau, & Gray, 2015). Research was also undertaken on German crowd-
funding, including crowd-investing, through a Delphi study focused on the potential of crowd-fund-
ing (Blohm et al., 2015) and an analysis of the market development (Hölzner, Kortleben, & Biering, 
2014). The European Commission, for instance, is currently undertaking a study to analyse the risks 
and potentials of Crowd-funding (European Commission, 2015).
Not surprisingly, the literature on crowd-investing, which only represents a small proportion of the 
crowd-funding market, is even more limited (Feller, Gleasure, & Treacy, 2013). Several academic ar-
ticles on crowd-investing, which depict the concept from an entrepreneural view, focus on legal 
regulations, especially the JOBS Act (Bradford, 2012; Cohn, 2012; Kassinger, Kaufmann, & Traeger, 
2013; Martin, 2012) or crowd-investing as inancing method (Bellelamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 
2010; Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012). Furthermore, some articles provide an overview of the 
crowd-funding research, categorising relevant literature by the participating actors in the process 
(Moritz & Block, 2014) or the diferent subtypes of crowd-funding (Feller et al., 2013). In most articles 
on crowd-funding in general however, crowd-investing is not mentioned (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 
2013).
Similar to international literature on crowd-investing, German literature focuses on legal condi-
tions (Hornuf, 2012), on the potential of crowd-investing for illing the equity gap (Dorleitner, Kapitz, 
& Wimmer, 2014; Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013; Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012) and on providing a com-
prehensive overview of the concept and subforms of crowd-funding (Hemer, 2011; Hemer, Schneider, 
Dornbusch, & Frey, 2011; Klöhn & Hornuf, 2012). Furthermore, the website www.fuer-gruender.de, 
which provides support for entrepreneurs, releases quarterly igures on crowd-funding. With the 
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exception of these igures however, the diferent articles, evince the continuous need for research to 
ensure constant topicality. Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013) for instance, provided a detailed exami-
nation of all, at that time 11, German crowd-investing platforms. At the present moment however, 
the crowd-investing market has almost tripled to 31 platforms, even though most of them do not 
have a signiicant market share. Furthermore, Kortleben and Vollmar (2012), categorised crowd-in-
vesting as funding source after friends and family inancing but before angel inancing, arguing that 
only smaller amounts can be raised through “the crowd”, compared to venture capital were busi-
ness angels invest average sums of 200,000 euros and venture capitalists sums above 500,000 eu-
ros. Although the categorisation of crowd-investing in seed and early stages still holds true, 
developments in the sector show the demand for a modiication of crowd-investing as inancing tool 
within the business cycle. Seedmatch for example successfully completed a project amounting for 3 
million euros and Companisto even managed to raise 7.5 million euros for a project completed in 
July 2014 (Companisto, 2015; Seedmatch, 2015).
Overall German crowd-investing in general is still a largely un-researched area, which at the same 
time is rapidly expanding and evolving. Therefore, this article aims to contribute to crowd-funding 
literature by providing an overview of the German crowd-investing market and analysing crowd-in-
vesting platforms predominantely from an entrepreneurial perspective. The focus is thereby put on 
crowd-investing, whereas the terms crowd-investing and equity-based crowd-funding are applied 
interchangeably.
Additionally, the analysis is intended to enhance the assessment of crowd-investing platforms, to 
identify whether platforms are a suitable inancing alternative for entrepreneurs and to support 
funders in the selection process. Consequentally, this article (1) provides a comprehensive analysis 
of the potential of crowd-investing as funding method in Germany, (2) analyses a census sample 
study where the German crowd-investing market, which consists of 31 platforms, and (3) presents a 
basis for the classiication and evaluation of the German crowd-investing market.
2. Crowd-investing: origins, development, classiication and deinition
Crowd-funding refers to a form of inancing, where projects or ventures are funded by raising small 
monetary contributions from a large group of people (“the crowd”), typically via internet, rather than 
a limited number of sophisticated investors (Bellelamme et al., 2014). The concept of crowd-fund-
ing emerges from crowd-sourcing, which is the approach where proit-oriented businesses address 
“the crowd” through an open call via internet, in order to obtain support, feedback and possible solu-
tions that can be implemented in production processes (Kleemann, Voß, & Rieder, 2008). Crowd-
sourcing can be further divided into the four subtypes: crowd-wisdom, crowd-creation, crowd-voting 
and crowd-funding (Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012). The term itself is an acronym derived from crowd 
and outsourcing (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). The voluntary involvement of “the crowd” is usually 
free of charge or compensated by a signiicantly smaller amount than the actual value generated for 
the company (Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012).
Although the term crowd-sourcing was irst introduced by Jef Howe in the June 2006 issue of the 
US technology magazine Wired (Bellelamme et al., 2010; Howe, 2006) its underlying idea can be 
traced back to the 18th century (Brabham, 2013) with historical examples such as the Longitude 
Prize, where the British Government ofered £20,000 for anyone who could provide a credible calcu-
lation for the longitude of a ship, or the Oxford English Dictionary, where 800 volunteers catalogued 
words for the irst publication (Dawson & Bynghall, 2012). An early, and what is argued to be the irst, 
example of crowd-funding is the construction of the Statue of Liberty’s base, where money was 
raised from 120,000 investors in exchange for the publication of their names, after inancial re-
sources for the building had become scarce (Leimeister, 2012).
Additionally, crowd-funding resembles the principle of microinance (Mollick, 2014), which is a 
source of inancing for entrepreneurs and small businesses that do not fulil the prerequisites to 
obtain a bank loan or other inancial services (Bradford, 2012). Reasons why these entrepreneurs are 
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denied inancial resources are lack of securities, high repayment risks, or too small sums of required 
capital (Bruton, Khavul, Siegel, & Wright, 2015). Furthermore, microinance-based funding can take 
the form of loans, donations or investments with potential money providers being both individuals 
and institutions (Hemer et al., 2011).
Despite the early emergence of oline crowd-funding, various authors argue that the develop-
ment of Web 2.0 was a decisive factor for the dissemination of information regarding the concept of 
crowd-sourcing, and consequently online crowd-funding (Brabham, 2008; Kleemann et al., 2008; 
Olson & Rosacker, 2013). Web 2.0 is regarded to be a version of the World Wide Web, where the 
network is seen as platform which allows the interactivity of users through technologies such as 
social networks, web applications or blogs (Rosen, 2011). The concept of 2.0 web-based crowd-fund-
ing initially emerged in the music industry (Bellelamme et al., 2010). Even though online crowd-
funding projects like the one from the rock band Marillion, who inanced their US tour by raising 
$60,000 from their fans via internet, date back to the mid-1990s, crowd-funding websites irst ap-
peared in the early 2000s. While some authors view online crowd-funding to have started with the 
US internet platform ArtistShare, which launched its irst project in 2003 (Freedman & Nutting, 2015; 
Laemmermann, 2012), others regard the German-based platform SellaBand, founded in 2006 as 
pioneer (Kappel, 2009; Macht & Weatherston, 2014). The basic idea behind both concepts is to ena-
ble musicians to inance their projects without the need of record labels. In exchange, money provid-
ers can obtain rewards such as backstage passes or gain access to the creative process of a project 
(ArtistShare, 2014; SellaBand, 2013). This form of crowd-funding, is therefore often referred to as 
reward-based crowd-funding (Bradford, 2012; Collins & Pierrakis, 2012). Haas, Blohm, and Leimeister 
(2014) categorise reward-based crowd-funding, where non-monetary incentives are given to inan-
cial backers, as hedonistic. Although both crowd-funding websites, ArtistShare and SellaBand, follow 
the same approach of enabling musicians to inance their projects through “the crowd” instead of 
record labels, ArtistShare initially characterised its concept as fan funding while SellaBand was the 
irst platform to apply the term crowd-funding (ArtistShare, 2014; Freedman & Nutting, 2015; 
SellaBand, 2013). However, the term crowd-funding itself was irst introduced by Michael Sullivan in 
2006 (Gass, 2011; Lawton & Marom, 2010). Furthermore, Lambert and Schwienbacher (2010, p. 6), 
who ofered the irst academic deinition, deined crowd-funding as:
an open call, essentially through the Internet, for the provision of inancial resources either 
in form of donation or in exchange for some form of reward and/or voting rights in order to 
support initiatives for speciic purposes
Crowd-investing (equity-based crowd-funding) is a form of crowd-funding based on the same fun-
damental principles as the above-mentioned early form of reward-based crowd-funding but with 
certain distinctions (Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012). The main similarities between crowd-investing and 
(reward-based) crowd-funding are that both are methods of project inancing through “the crowd” 
via internet. Nonetheless, both models difer with respect to the underlying inancing method 
(Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). Unlike reward-based crowd-funding where money providers, usually, 
obtain non-monetary rewards, such as the mentioning of the name on a CD cover, tickets for the 
funded event, or material incentives, like the pre-purchase of products in exchange for contributions 
(Hemer et al., 2011), supporters of crowd-investing projects have the possiblility to receive monetary 
contributions in the form of interests or dividends (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013; Kortleben & Vollmar, 
2012). Hence, crowd-investing is based on a for-proit approach, were inanciers expect returns rath-
er than donations (altrusim/patronage-model) or non-monetary compensations (hedonism).
In the crowd-investing model, money providers are regarded as investors and the inanced pro-
jects are linked to start-ups or already established companies, rather than to individuals (Hemer et 
al., 2011). Moreover, there are diferent involvement possibilities for investors who make monetary 
contributions such as company shares, silent participations, proit participating rights or participat-
ing loans (Bellelamme et al., 2014; Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). Consequently, equity crowd-fund-
ing can be regarded as a form of external inancing with a liability feature and respectively as equity 
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capital (Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012). Additionally, capital inlow through equity-based crowd-funding 
can serve as a hybrid inancial instrument such as mezzanine capital (Klöhn & Hornuf, 2012).
Even though there is yet no uniform and established deinition of crowd-investing, the need for an 
extended deinition of crowd-funding becomes evident taken the above mentioned into account. 
Mollick (2014) extended the deinition of Bellelamme et al. (2010) to it an entrepreneurial context 
by providing the following enhancement:
Crowd-funding refers to the eforts by entrepreneurial individuals and groups–cultural, 
social, and for-proit–to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small contributions 
from a relatively large number of individuals using the internet, without standard inancial 
intermediaries
Although this deinition includes “the crowd” and addresses entrepreneurs, it still does not refer 
to crowd-investing or equity crowd-funding as such, implying the need for a separate deinition. An 
example of a deinition that approaches this issue is provided by Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013):
Crowd-investing is a inancing method for young ventures and other commercial projects 
that supports the acquisition of equity by coordinating the submission of diferent forms of 
shares to an undeined group of possible investors through social virtual communities
Moreover, although both forms of crowd-funding are available to entrepreneurs, Bellelamme et 
al. (2014) found that entrepreneurs prefer reward-based crowd-funding if small amounts of capital 
are required and equity-based crowd-funding for larger sums. Additionally, academic literature is 
increasingly supporting the view that crowd-investing can provide a valuable supplement or even 
alternative method, to for example bank loans or venture capital, for entrepreneurs to acquire the 
necessary inancial resources, especially in early stages of business start-ups (Agrawal, Catalini, & 
Goldfarb, 2013; Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013; Mollick, 2014). Considering the di culties that entrepre-
neurs face when trying to raise capital in initial stages (Cosh, Cumming, & Hughes, 2009) and the 
number of start-ups that already fail in the attempt (Casamatta & Haritchabalet, 2013) crowd-in-
vesting could have an impact on enterpreneurial culture in illing the funding gap.
3. Financing di culties for entrepreneurs in early stages
Successful entrepreneurial enterprises pass through diferent growth stages throughout their life 
cycles (Mac an Bhaird, 2010; Stokes, Wilson, & Mador, 2010). However, a number of varying venture 
growth models have been developed, characterising three (Steinmetz, 1969; Vozikis, 1984), four 
(Dodge & Robbins, 1992) or even ive diferent stages (Greiner, 1972; Scott & Bruce, 1987) in the busi-
ness life cycle. Although the venture life cycle model is not always applicable due to its linear struc-
ture, rigid assumption of a constant growth through all stages, and lack of adjustment, to for 
example diferent industries, the model is useful for providing a better understanding and illustra-
tion of the entrepreneurial process (Poutziouris, 2003). Furthermore, the diferent life cycle stages 
are characterised by diferent entrepreneurial activities and changing inancial requirements and 
sources (Leach & Melicher, 2011). Within the context of this article the taxonomy and limitations of 
the model will not be further speciied, but rather a ive-stage cycle applied (Figure 1) with focus put 
on the inancial aspects of the diferent stages.
In the development stage, the initial stage of the venture life cycle, entrepreneurs require a mul-
titude of diferent resources besides capital including manpower, furnishings, tax accounting and 
legal advice (Gibbons, Hisrich, & DaSilva, 2014). At this stage entrepreneurs use seed capital as pri-
mary form of inancing, to ascertain the lucrativeness and feasibility of the business concept (Leach 
& Melicher, 2011). During the seed phase, also referred to as initial-stage inancing, the product or 
service has not yet been developed and the young company is therefore unable to generate proits 
and both net income and cash lows are negative (Caselli, 2010; Smith, Smith, Smith, & Bliss, 2011). 
Moreover, entrepreneurs primarily make use of their own inancial resources (Sherman, 2012) and 
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often employ methods such as bootstrapping during this process step (Gibbons et al., 2014). 
Moreover, family and friends function as a further source of inancing in the course of the seed stage 
by providing money in terms of either loan or equity capital (Molle & Djarova, 2009; Theeuwes, 2013). 
Throughout literature, the umbrella term used for inancing through Founders, Family and Friends is 
FFF. Although Business Angels may invest at this stage, the required investments are often too small 
for investors to become interested (Tomczak & Brem, 2013). Typically, this primary phase concludes 
with the preparation of a concrete business plan and the selection of a suitable legal form for the 
company (Vinturella & Erickson, 2013).
The start-up stage, the subsequent stage, commences with the legal foundation of the company 
and ends with the market entry (Fischer, 2004; Kuratko, 2014). This phase is characterised by initial 
production and sales numbers as well as irst returns (Hahn, 2014). Nevertheless, the launching 
costs are very high, revenues usually low and if any proits are generated they are only marginal 
(Reichle, 2010). The form of inancing required to achieve the initial production is referred to as, 
start-up inancing (Leach & Melicher, 2011). Although at this stage, FFF inancing is still relevant, 
entrepreneurs begin to search for sources of venture capital such as venture capitalists and business 
angels for external equity inancing. However, business angels can also be organised networks or 
groups, such as the German business angel network—BAND (2015) or the European network—EBAN 
(2014), that serve as platforms for raising capital, sharing know-how and supporting co-operations. 
Angel investment especially comes into consideration when FFF capital is already exhausted but 
capital requirements are still too low for venture capitalists’ investments, and are often the irst 
source of external inancing (McKaskill, 2009; Tomczak & Brem, 2013). The money pooled from the 
individual investors is usually distributed to fund diferent startups as a measure of risk reduction. It 
may occur, that business angels and venture capitalists invest in the seed-phase of businesses, es-
pecially businesses with high-potential, this is however rather rare due to the small amounts of capi-
tal required by entrepreneurs at this stage (Cornwall, Vang, & Hartman, 2013).
Figure 1. Financing throughout 
the business cycle.
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As the company continues to grow and pass through further stages, the types and sources of i-
nancing increase and vary (Benjamin & Margulis, 2005). During the expansion stage entrepreneurs 
expand their businesses through growth inancing in the form of debt, equity and mezzanine capital 
but also government assistance programmes might be applied (Volkmann, Tokarski, & Grünhagen, 
2010). During the subsequent bridge phase, the venture has generated a sales and revenues history 
and both private and public capital become available to the company (Seidman, 2005). Once this life 
cycle stage has been reached, the business can also obtain inancing through stock exchange (Leach 
& Melicher, 2011). At maturity stage, the company experiences a further increase in cash lows and 
revenues and capital is obtained from similar resources as in the previous stage (Damodaran, 2010).
Within the framework of this article, solely seed and start-up inancing, which both refer to the 
early phase of young enterprises (Whalley, 2011) will be further analysed, especially with regard to 
crowd-investing. During these both initial stages, the primary source of inancing is the business 
angel market place followed by venture capital irms (Mason & Harrison, 2000). The investments 
obtained by angels range between 25,000 euros and 500,000 euros and venture capitalists above 
500,000 euros (Bellelamme et al., 2013).
4. Crowd-investing platforms
The crowd-funding process was originally carried out through direct interaction between inancial 
providers and project owners, via social media tools (Zvilichovsky, Inbar, & Barzilay, 2014), such as 
“Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn and diferent other specialised blogs” (Heminway & Hofman, 2012, p. 
881). Diferent factors such as the development of Web 2.0, the increasing popularity of crowd-
sourcing and the impeding conditions for entrepreneurs seeking funds in the aftermath of the inan-
cial crisis, have given rise to the development of crowd-funding platforms (Giudici, Nava, Rossi 
Lamastra, & Verecondo, 2012). Crowd-funding platforms function as facilitators between crowd-
funders and project initiators (De Buysere, Gajda, Kleverlaan, & Marom, 2012; Sannajust, Roux, & 
Chaibi, 2014; Schwienbacher & Larralde, 2012), whereas in the case of crowd-investing or equity-
based crowd-funding the projects are mainly undertaken by entrepreneurs and enterprises who 
seek equity funding from “the crowd” (Bellelamme et al., 2014). These service providers gather 
monetary contributions from equity investors via internet, and transfer these to the appropriate 
project owners, thus “creating a dynamic funding network” (Zvilichovsky et al., 2014, p. 1). In this 
context, crowd-investors and entrepreneurs represent the relevant parties in the two-sided, or rath-
er multi-sided market with crowd-funding platforms as intermediaries (Bellelamme et al., 2014; 
Zvilichovsky et al., 2014).
In accordance with Bellelamme and Lambert (2014), crowd-investing platforms function similar 
to traditional inancial intermediaries in reducing information asymmetries, transaction costs and 
risk. Hagedorn and Pinkwart (2013) argue that crowd-investing platforms in their function as inter-
mediaries closely resemble venture capital irms, which also perform tasks such as risk and size 
transformation. Risk reduction on platforms, for instance, is achieved by downsizing and transferring 
the default risk to relevant investors. Furthermore, crowd-investing platforms, similar to venture 
capital irms, screen, select and coordinate potential projects and proof their suitability. On the con-
trary, Kortleben and Vollmar (2012) emphasise that although both venture capital irms and crowd-
investing platforms search for companies in a similar manner, all other process steps difer 
considerably. Venture capital irms, for example, undertake an elaborate due diligance procedure ( 
Reißig-Thust, 2003 ) whereas, in the case of crowd-investing, investors have to evaluate the respec-
tive business plans since platforms only undertake an initial selection. Additionally, unlike venture 
capitalists crowd-investors are not actively involved in the decision-making process and the person-
nel of platforms might not be as experienced as that of venture capital irms in assisting entrepre-
neurs (Kortleben & Vollmar, 2012).
Furthermore, contrary to other intermediaries, platforms do not directly fulil a brokerage func-
tion, since they neither undertake own investment decisions nor fund management activities 
(Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). Although crowd-investing platforms connect investors and 
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entrepreneurs, coordinating supply and demand of assets, the collected money is directly distribut-
ed to entrepreneurs (Klöhn & Hornuf, 2012). This increases the transparency of capital lows and 
allows investors to make direct investments, compared to other inancial intermediaries such as 
banks and venture capital irms. A further advantage of crowd-investing compared to traditional 
intermediaries is the provision of social capital which has a positive efect on the inancing success 
of the entrepreneur (Blohm et al., 2015; Zvilichovsky et al., 2014). Consequently, crowd-investing 
platforms “are not only intermediaries of monetary transactions, but also loci of social connections” 
(Colombo, Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015).
5. Crowd-investing in Germany
An important factor that providers of crowd-funding platforms, but also entrepreneurs and inves-
tors, must take into consideration, is the statutory requirements for crowd-investing. Contrary to 
other subtypes of crowd-funding, crowd-investing is subject to legal regulations (Bellelamme et al., 
2014). The primary reason for this is that equity-based crowd-funding allows investors to obtain re-
turns or proit shares, thus involving securities ( Bradford, 2012 ). In the wake of inancial crises, es-
pecially the inancial crisis of 2008, reporting scandals and corporate governance issues security 
market regulations have been signiicantly intensiied (Ball, 2009; Shleifer, 2002). Accordingly, in 
many countries legislations have been adapted to regulate crowd-investing primarily in order to 
migitate information asymmetries between investors and entrepreneurs and thus increase investor 
protection (Kappel, 2009; Mollick, 2014; Wardrop et al., 2015). Although in some countries, such as 
Japan, crowd-investing has been banned (Kirby & Worner, 2014) other areas, for instance the US, UK 
and continental Europe, have had a more positive view of equity-based crowd-funding (European 
Commission, 2014; Hölzner et al., 2014; Kitchens & Torrence, 2012). However, while some authors 
argue that approaches to regulation facilitate the access to capital for entreprenurs (Klöhn & Hornuf, 
2012; Stemler, 2013) others argue that increased regulations might harm entrepreneurs, especially 
of small irms (Heminway, 2013; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015). Legislation on crowd-investing 
often impedes the funding of entrepreneurial projects by restricting investments to sophisticated 
investors, limiting the number of inanciers per project, or imposing restrictions on entrepreneurs by 
regulating the permissible size of companies interested in applying equity-based crowd-funding 
(Gri n, 2013; Kirby & Worner, 2014).
Although Germany followed a laissez-faire approach regarding crowd-investing regulation, regu-
latory changes were undertaken in the German Small Investor Protection Act which came into force 
in July 2015 (Fricke, 2015; Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015). The US CROWDFUND Act, or JOBS Act Title 
III, which will come into force in October 2015, served as model to the legislative adaption (Almerico, 
2014; Hölzner et al., 2014). However, US regulations on crowd-investing are stricter since they, for 
example, only allow investments to accredited investors (SEC, 2012). With Title III of the act how-
ever, investments will be extended to non-accredited investors and intermediary functions restrict-
ed to registered broker-dealers and crowd-investing platforms ( Lion, 2015 ).
The legislative changes in Germany provide that crowd-investing platforms ensure to inform in-
vestors of potential risks during the investment process ( Fricke, 2015 ). These amendments restrict 
private investors to investments of up to 10,000 euros, depending on their income, but allow profes-
sional investors and limited companies to invest higher sums ( Müller-Schmale, 2014 ). Additionally, 
capital seeking companies can raise up to 2.5 million euros without the need of platforms registering 
a prospectus. Although this is an improvement since the legislative proposal planned to restrict the 
sum to 1 million euros, other European countries like Austria or Italy have limits of 5 million euros 
(German Crowd-funding Network, 2015). Further changes include the implementation of the right of 
withdrawal for investors as well as the electronic processing of investment information sheets to 
facilitate process handling.
Before the German Parliament passed the act on crowd-investing, platforms bypassed the secu-
rity law through proit participating loans, which were not regulated in the German Security 
Prospectus Act (Hornuf & Schwienbacher, 2015). Through this inancial instrument, which allows 
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investors to beneit from returns, but only if proits are made by entrepreneurs, crowd-investing 
platforms were able to manage projects with unlimited sums (Wardrop et al., 2015). However, with 
the act the regulatory gap was removed and an exemption for crowd-investing were established.
Even though some exemptions have been made for German crowd-investing platforms, too com-
plex regulations might increase operating expenses and reduce the market accessibility of equity-
based crowd-funding (Wardrop et al., 2015). The new crowd-investing legislation has already led to 
uncertainty in the sector and is likely to evoke stagnation rather than further growth (Blohm et al., 
2015; Für-Gründer.de, 2015). Therefore, a number of authors suggest that German legislators should 
follow other regulatory models, such as that in the UK, which currently has the most developed 
crowd-investing market, instead of orienting on the US JOBS Act (Hölzner et al., 2014; Wardrop et al., 
2015). The tax incentives ofered to crowd-investors in the UK, for instance, could lead to a substan-
tial increase in the inancing volume of crowd-investing in Germany (Hölzner et al., 2014).
One of the reasons why German start-ups demand further regulatory developments in favour of 
crowd-investing is the still underdeveloped inancing situation for entrepreneurs in Germany 
(German Startups Association, 2014). In particular, access to seed capital remains problematic com-
pared to other countries such as the US or the UK and entrepreneurs at this inancing stage are 
largely dependent on domestic funding. The advancement and growth of crowd-investing, which is 
also determined by the according regulations, could therefore have a considerable impact on 
German entrepreneurial culture.
Although until 2013, there had been a decline in the total number of business start-ups, with liq-
uidations exceeding foundations, numbers have been rising again since 2014 (BMWi, 2013; Metzger, 
2015). Nonetheless, the number of entrepreneurs facing inancing di culties has elevated, due to 
increased capital expenditures regardless of lower fractional amounts and a higher number of en-
trepreneurs without capital use ( Metzger, 2015 ). Data on the funding sources of start-ups indicate 
that entrepreneurs primarily use their own savings followed by funding through family and friends 
and governmental funds (Ripsa & Tröge, 2014). Although entrepreneurs classify venture capital as 
important funding source, only 21.4% of the surveyed start-ups have used it as inancing method 
and most entrepreneurs report di culties in accessibility (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013; Ripsa & Tröge, 
2014). However, venture capitalists are more di cult to access than business angels. In another 
study by Hagen, Metzger, and Ullrich (2012), 71% of the start-ups reported to have severe di culties 
in raising capital in early stages. Nevertheless, crowd-investing still plays a tangential role in German 
start-up inancing compared to other funding sources and is currently even less relevant than bank 
loans (Ripsa & Tröge, 2014). One of the reasons for the limited relevance of crowd-investing in 
Germany could be the low awareness level of crowd-funding in general. A survey conducted by 
Harms (2015) revealed that only 51.8% of the respondents had heard of crowd-funding and merely 
24.5% actually knew what crowd-funding is? Furthermore, solely 7.3% of the respondents had 
helped inance a crowd-funding project.
A Delphi study with 117 experts across diferent sectors predicted that the German crowd-invest-
ing sector, similar to global developments, will experience a compound annual growth rate of 30% 
until 2020 being an important source for start-ups funding (Blohm et al., 2015). Statistics for the irst 
half of 2015 show a dynamic growth for crowd-lending, with a volume twice as high as for the entire 
year 2014 (74.2 million euros compared to 35.6 million), whereas only 9.6 million euros were raised 
through crowd-investing (Für-Gründer.de, 2015). These results are consistent with the general trend 
in European countries, where crowd-lending by far exceeds crowd-investing (Wardrop et al., 2015).
Even though Germany has the third largest crowd-funding market in Europe, the market volume 
is virtually insigniicant compared to the UK, where 3.56 billion euros have been raised in total, and 
2.38 billion euros in 2014 alone (Wardrop et al., 2015). Additionally, the UK has a market share of 
74.3% compared to 25.7% which accounts for the rest of Europe. Altogether, the annual average 
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growth rate of 146% for Europe as a whole (115% without UK and 159% for UK alone) exempliies 
the potential of crowd-funding and crowd-investing as alternative inancing tool.
The future growth (or even decline) of German crowd-investing however will be very much deter-
mined by reaction of investors to the 2015 changes in the German legal framework. Klöhn, Hornuf, 
and Schilling’s (2015) critique of the impact on investors of the 2015 Small Investor Protection Act is 
scathing; “… it does not do justice to the economic potential of crowdfunding and crowdinvesting 
nor can it be expected that it will materially improve investor protection” (p. 11). While the law does 
for the irst time provide a cohesive set of regulations for the crowd-investing sector, it also intro-
duces signiicant disclosure requirements and limits on investors who wish to subscribe for more 
than €1,000, in that they need to declare €100,000 or more liquid assets to be able to do so. Klöhn 
et al. (2015) point out that it is entirely possible that investors may decline to invest more than 
€1,000 on German crowd-investing platforms now “… for fear of losing conidentiality of their inan-
cial data.” (p. 17) and that while investments over €1,000 constitute only 15% of all investors, those 
15% contribute 76% of the total market volume. Therefore, if these investors were put of by the 
substantial additional disclosure requirements then “… the market would sufer a signiicant adverse 
impact.” (p. 17). A clear concern is that, faced with such restrictive requirements in Germany, highly 
liquid investors may switch from German platforms to platforms in less legally restrictive and re-
laxed regulatory environments such as the Netherlands and the UK which don’t have such disclosure 
requirements.
6. German crowd-funding platforms
The German Crowd-funding market in September 2015 consisted of 91 platforms (Figure 2). Reward-
based crowd-funding represents the largest group with 45%, whereas 15 of the 41 reward-based 
platforms have a regional focus and one is even operated by a German bank. Although lending-
based platforms only account for 10% of the total market, this sector is characterised by strong 
growth, especially in terms of credit volume. The equity-based crowd-funding market, which will be 
the proportion further analysed in this article, constitutes the second largest sector with 34% or 31 
in absolute numbers (summarised in Table 1 overleaf).
As illustrated in Figure 3, the number of crowd-investing platform foundations per year has been 
rather volatile since the emergence of the irst platform in 2011. However, it should be mentioned 
that the graph only includes the 31 platforms that are still currently active and not the ones that 
were shut down.
Although all crowd-investing platforms founded in 2011 were “cross-sectoral”, meaning that they 
administer projects of companies from diferent sectors, since 2012 platforms have emerged that 
exclusively manage projects from one sector. The cross-sectoral platforms still represent the largest 
group, with 61%; followed by the environmental platforms which constitute 19% of all crowd-invest-
ing platforms and real estate platforms, which make up 13%. Substantial diferences in the perfor-
mance of the individual platforms are evident. Although some of the diferences, for example in 
Figure 2. Crowd-funding 
platforms by subtype.
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Table 1. Summary of crowd-investing platforms characteristics
Name Sectors Founding 
year
Financed 
projects 
(No.)
Failed 
projects 
(No.)
Ongoing 
projects 
(No.)
Success 
rate (%)
Total sum 
raised by 
PF (€)
Lowest 
project 
sum (€)
Highest 
project 
sum (€)
Average 
project 
sum (€)
Min 
investment 
(€)
Max 
investment 
(€)
Registered 
investors 
(No.)
Aescuvest Medical 2014 0 n.d. 2 n.d. 0 n.r. n.r n.r. 250 unlimited n.d.
Bankless24 Mixed 2012 8 n.d. 0 n.d. 644000 50900 100000 77659 100 unlimited n.d.
Bergfürst Mixed 2012 2 n.d. 2 n.d. 4092000 1100000 2992000 2046000 10 unlimited 11000
Bettervest Environmen-
tal Projects
 2012 27 0 2 100% 1661700 4150 385150 24021 50 unlimited 1500
Bürgerzins Environmen-
tal Projects
2015 0 n.d. 4 n.d. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. 100 unlimited n.d.
Cinedime Film Financ-
ing
2014 1 1 1 50% 60000 60000 60000 60000 100 unlimited n.d.
Companisto Mixed 2011 0 0 3 100% 21270295 41290 7500000 233220 5 unlimited 40247
CROWD NINE Mixed 2013 2 n.d. 0 n.d. 67000 16900 50100 33500 100 10000 n.d.
CrowdEner.gy Environmen-
tal Projects
n.d. 4 1 n.d. 0.8 165000 18000 65000 35497 500 unlimited n.d.
Crowdrange Mixed 2012 0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 50 100000 n.d.
DEUTSCHE-
MIKROIN-
VEST
Mixed 2012 29 n.d. 6 n.d. 8700000 100000 3500000 188328 250 unlimited n.d.
EASY 
CROWD-
FUNDING
Mixed 2015 0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 100 100000 n.d.
Econeers Environmen-
tal Projects
2013 5 3 2 63% 3188500 180000 1000000 538383 250 unlimited 1805
Exporo Real Estate 2014 2 n.d. 2 n.d. 3467200 1351000 2116200 1733600 500 unlimited n.d. 
FinMatch Mixed 2014 0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
FunderNation Mixed 2014 2 3 6 0.4 3550900 350900 3200000 1059660 100 unlimited 296
Fundsters Mixed 2012 10 n.d. 0 n.d. 781508 41158 154744 70743 1 unlimited 4297
Green Crowd-
ing
n.d. 2015 0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
GreenX-
money
Environmen-
tal Projects
2014 9 n.d. 1 n.d. 267500 6000 60000 22532 500 n.d. n.d.
Innovest-
ment
Mixed 2011 29 n.d. 0 n.d. 2441064 25250 175000 78090 1000 unlimited n.d.
Kapital-
freunde
Real Estate 2012 2 n.d. n.d. n.d. 187750 67500 120250 90094 250 unlimited n.d.
LightFin Mixed 2013 1 n.d. 2 n.d. 530000 530000 530000 530000 250 
(100.000)*
unlimited n.d.
(Continued)
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Notes: n.d. denotes no data available from website.
n.r. denotes data not recorded by website.
Name Sectors Founding 
year
Financed 
projects 
(No.)
Failed 
projects 
(No.)
Ongoing 
projects 
(No.)
Success 
rate (%)
Total sum 
raised by 
PF (€)
Lowest 
project 
sum (€)
Highest 
project 
sum (€)
Average 
project 
sum (€)
Min 
investment 
(€)
Max 
investment 
(€)
Registered 
investors 
(No.)
Mezzany Real Estate 2015 1 n.d. 0 n.d. 2455000 2455000 2455000 2455000 1000 unlimited n.d.
MyBusiness-
Backer
Mixed 2012 1 1 n.d. 0.5 50300 50300 50300 50300 100 100000 n.d.
Seedmatch Mixed 2011 81 3 2 96% 24374500 56000 3000000 204525 250 unlimited 40907
Startkaptial-
Online
Mixed 2012 2 3 n.d. 33% 59000 450 37050 11800 25 100000 n.d.
United Equity Mixed 2014 3 2 n.d. 66% n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 100 1000000 n.d.
Universso Mixed 2013 0 n.d. 3 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 100 n.d. n.d.
Unternehm-
erich
Mixed 2014 2 n.d. 0 n.d. 151600 3600 148000 75800 250 n.d. n.d.
Welcome 
Investment
IT/Software 2014 2 n.d. n.d. n.d. 32600 10000 22600 16300 n.d. 1000000 n.d.
ZINSLAND Real Estate 2015 1 0 1 1 750000 750000 750000 750000 500 unlimited n.d.
Table 1. (Continued)
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project numbers or total sums raised by the individual platforms could be analysed, other variables 
such as the success rate could not be identiied because most platforms do not display their failed 
projects. On platforms where enough information was disclosed, success rates ranged from 33% to 
100%. Furthermore, the analysis evinced substantial diferences in the sums raised by a platform. 
Figure 4 illustrates the sum raised by the platforms in which seven largest platforms account for 
83% of the total sum raised by all crowd-investing platforms, whereas Seedmatch, the largest plat-
form, has a share of 31% (24,374,500 euros) and Companisto, the second largest, one of 27% 
(21,270,295 euros).
7. German crowd-investing projects
Since 2011 there have been 265 successful projects which amount to a total of 78,944,892 euros 
(Table 2).
A further analysis of the individual projects shows that the number of projects is more or less 
evenly distributed among diferent sectors with exception of the ilm and medical sector were only 
very few projects have been funded (Figure 5). It is notable that although only a small number of 
projects have been realised in real estate, projects in this sector account for the largest share. This is 
because, these projects usually require large investments. For instance, the project with the highest 
investment (7,500,000 euros) was a real estate project funded on Companisto. What was also 
Figure 3. Platform foundations 
per year.
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Figure 4. Market share of 
platforms.
Table 2. Project investment raised
No. of projects Raised Max. Min. Median
265 78,944,892 € 3,600 € 7,500,000 € 100,000 €
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notable, was that a large number of projects were online or rather internet based. This is represented 
by the sector IT/App, which included data storage systems and a range of diferent apps, but also by 
the category Online Services/E-Commerce which depicts companies that exclusively provide their 
projects and services via internet. Due to the large quantity of these internet-based projects, they 
were divided into two categories to present a more detailed overview. Green Projects, also represent 
a large proportion of crowd-investing projects. The investments in this sector were as low as 4,750 
euros but also large sums of up to 3,500,000 euros were raised through green projects.
8. German crowd-investing platforms terms and conditions
From an entrepreneurial perspective, it is also important to consider the terms and conditions for 
using a platform for company inancing purposes. Although there were some slight diferences re-
garding the project conditions, costs involved and access barriers, the structure of the individual 
platforms was comparable. Apart from exceptions like Seedmatch which primarily selects funding 
projects starting at 100,000 euros, almost no platform speciies the minimum of maximum project 
investment (Table 3). For investors, the minimum investments vary between 1 euro and 1,000 euros, 
whereas LightFin ofers institutional investor contributions starting from 100,000 euros. Although 
maximum investments are predominantly not limited, some platforms restrict the investments to 
1,000,000 euros, 100,000 euros or even 10,000 euros depending on the investor participation form. 
As illustrated in Table 4, the cost structures for entrepreneurs also vary slightly depending on the 
platform.
Figure 5. Projects by sector.
Table 3. Project sum and restrictions
Restrictions related 
to project sums (€)
Range (€) Mode (€) Comments
Min. investment per 
investor
1–1000 100 One platform ofered insti-
tutional investors to invest 
in projects starting at a 
min. sum of €100,000
Max investment per 
investor
10,000-Unlimited Unlimited  
Min. project sum allowed Unspeciied Unspeciied Only Seedmatch requested 
min. project sums of 
€100,000
Max. project sum allowed Unlimited Unlimited
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9. Summary and conclusions
In accordance with a number of authors (inter alia Macht & Weatherston, 2014; Mollick, 2014; 
Tomczak & Brem, 2013) the indings of this study support the view that crowd-investing provides a 
suitable inancing method for entrepreneurs in early stages. Nevertheless, unlike Hagedorn and 
Pinkwart (2013) who categorise crowd-investing for projects starting from 100,000 euros and 
Kortleben and Vollmar (2012) for projects below 200,000 euros, this article would extend this clas-
siication, since results showed that projects can range from sums far below 100,000 euros to sums 
over several millions. However, results were consistent with Dorleitner et al. (2014) in regard to 
project sums currently still being in the low-six igure range, although there is a clear tendency up-
wards. Furthermore, the additional administrative and accounting challenges for entrepreneurs ap-
plying crowd-investing, highlighted by some authors (Kitchens & Torrence, 2012; Valanciene & 
Jegeleviciute, 2013) do not apply for German crowd-investing, since the platforms undertake these 
tasks.
The overall German crowd-investing market currently still represents a niche, constituting only 3% 
(Hölzner et al., 2014) of the venture capital market. Since average project sums are as low as 100,000 
euros, crowd-investing should (currently still) be regarded as supplement to other equity funding 
methods rather than alternative. However some platforms, for instance Companisto, have close 
cooperation with venture capital irms and corporate inance specialists to assure venture capital 
compatibility to entrepreneurs ( Companisto, 2015 ).
The German crowd-investing platforms represent 34% of the overall crowd-funding market. 
Although most platforms manage projects from diferent sectors, platforms which specialise in one 
particular sector are increasingly emerging. Furthermore, the market is dominated by only a few 
platforms regarding both total sums raised by platforms and number of projects. Moreover, crowd-
investing projects are realised across diferent sectors, with internet-based projects constituting the 
largest proportion (36%) followed by projects in real estate (24%) and green projects (19%). Although 
the individual project sums range from 3,600 euros to 7,500,000 euros the median is 100,000 
euros.
Table 4. Costs for platform usage
Costs for 
entrepreneur/
company
Range Mode Comments
Cost of platform use as a 
percentage of project sum 
raised
2–12 8–10 One platform requested 
a ixed sum of £500 
independent of the total 
sum raised
Cost paid by investor as a 
percentage
4–12 See comment Range of models used 
by platforms; some 
determined by entrepre-
neur, some by platforms 
according the risk proile of 
company/sector, some by 
under-lying proit sharing 
scheme of platform
Payback period (Years) 1–12 2–5 Diferent models according 
to platform; some have 
low ixed interest rates 
on investment with exit 
payment, some have semi-
annual interest payments, 
some have annual interest 
payments plus proit 
participation (which makes 
for highly variable payback 
period)
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In the light of the increased di culties entrepreneurs face in the search for external capital, espe-
cially since the inancial crisis, crowd-funding could gain importance within the context of entrepre-
neurial inance (Hagedorn & Pinkwart, 2013). In particular, crowd-investing, which closely resembles 
other forms of external equity inancing, could facilitate the access to capital, via an open call 
through the internet, and thus help founders overcome funding gaps in early stages (Macht & 
Weatherston, 2014). Crowd-investing platforms as intermediaries thereby play a crucial role, since 
funding processes take place on platforms, where the according providers coordinate and manage 
entrepreneurial projects (Tomczak & Brem, 2013). Therefore, this study focused on analysing the 
German crowd-investing market, consisting of 31 platforms, to enable a categorisation of the mar-
ket potential of crowd-investing in Germany as well as an evaluation of the applicability for entrepre-
neurs. Thus, an attempt was made to identify diferent characteristics of platforms that could serve 
as orientation for entrepreneurs throughout the platform selection process.
This article gave a critical overview of the relevant literature, by predominantly discussing the 
relevance of crowd-investing from an entrepreneurial perspective as well as the function of crowd-
investing platforms. The results from both the literature review and the research showed that com-
pared to leading countries, such as the UK, the German crowd-funding market is very small, 
consisting of only 91 crowd-funding platforms, of which 31 are crowd-investing platforms. Within 
Continental Europe however, Germany represents the second largest market only slightly behind 
France (Wardrop et al., 2015). So far, the 31 German crowd-investing platforms have successfully 
completed 265 projects which accumulate to nearly 79 million euros. Nevertheless, a large fraction 
of the market is divided among a small number of successful platforms. Findings indicate that the 
seven largest platforms take account for 83% of the total sum raised by all platforms and 67% of all 
realised projects. Seedmatch, the largest platform, has a market share of 31% for both total sum 
and number of projects and Companisto, the second largest platform, accounts for 27% of the total 
sum and 16% of all the projects. Although crowd-investing projects are realised across diferent sec-
tors, most completed projects are internet based (36%), followed by real estate projects (24%) and 
green projects (19%). Moreover, even though the median project sum is 100,000 euros a number of 
projects amounted to several million euros. It was also noticeable that although most platforms 
manage and coordinate projects of diferent sectors, in recent years a number of platforms have 
emerged which specialise in one speciic sector. Especially some of the platforms in the environmen-
tal and real estate sector have gained market share.
In accordance with Bechter and Frey (2011) and Sigar (2012) the analysis of the German crowd-
investing platforms showed, that access barriers for entrepreneurs are much lower compared to 
other equity sources, such as business angels and venture capital irms. However, although most 
crowd-investing platforms do not specify any demands for entrepreneurs, some platforms such as 
Seedmatch and Innovestment require start-ups to have a legal form, which could represent a irst 
inancing obstacle for young entrepreneurs, since the foundation of, for instance GmbH, requires 
25,000 euro share capital (Katins, 2013). However, most platforms do not have this requirement. 
Similar to indings from Valanciene and Jegeleviciute (2013), this research also showed, that con-
trary to other equity sources, entrepreneurs who make use of crowd-investing mostly do not lose 
control over managerial decisions unless they wish so, since few platforms have models which give 
participation rights to investors. Additionally, in some of the platforms, especially the most success-
ful ones, entrepreneurs actively use the platform as communication tool to inform their investors 
and keep them up to date. Furthermore, similar to the indings of Dorleitner et al. (2014), it was 
found that the underlying concepts of the diferent crowd-investing platforms provide a high degree 
of lexibility to investors regarding the duration of capital commitment, rate of returns and participa-
tion models. Nevertheless, some of the indings contradicted those found throughout the literature. 
The disadvantages stated by some authors, related to increased administrative and accounting 
challenges (Kitchens & Torrence, 2012; Valanciene & Jegeleviciute, 2013) did not apply to German 
crowd-investing platforms, since platform providers undertake these tasks.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [N
or
thu
mb
ria
 U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
3:2
5 0
9 F
eb
ru
ary
 20
16
 
Page 17 of 20
Grundy & Ohmer, Cogent Business & Management (2016), 3: 1138849
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2016.1138849
German crowd-investing platforms can serve as useful funding source for entrepreneurs, howev-
er, since median project sums are still very low, at 100,000 euros, crowd-investing should currently 
still be regarded as supplementary to other external equity sources, rather than alternative. 
Nevertheless, crowd-investing can help entrepreneurs overcome funding gaps. Additionally, given 
that some platforms closely cooperate with venture capital irms and corporate inance specialists 
to assure venture capital compatibility, follow-up inancing, for entrepreneurs applying crowd-in-
vesting, could be facilitated. Moreover, the analysis of the individual projects also demonstrated that 
higher amounts, of several millions, could be obtained for individual projects, and further research 
showed that average project sums are increasing (Für-Gründer.de,  2015), implying future potential 
in the crowd-funding market. Although there is growth potential in the crowd-investing market re-
garding the number of projects and total sums, the analysis of the diferent platforms suggest a 
saturation of the market since a small number of platforms make up most of the market. Additionally, 
these few successful platforms follow slightly diferent concepts, for example through diferent cus-
tomer or rather investor segmentation, thus increasing market entry barriers for new platforms. 
However, some of the platforms which focus on niche sectors have managed to successfully enter 
the market.
10. Further avenues
Although this article aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the German crowd-investing 
sector, a number of questions accrued throughout the research process that could serve as a basis 
for further research. An additional analysis of crowd-lending platforms could provide an insight into 
the funding possibilities ofered to entrepreneurs and applied supplementary to this research. 
Moreover, a comparison of German crowd-investing platforms with crowd-investing markets of oth-
er countries could contribute to a better categorisation of the development status of crowd-invest-
ing in general and assessment of the future market potential. In this context, a comparison of 
German crowd-investing platforms with UK platforms as benchmark, could serve as orientation to 
enhance the performance of German platforms. Furthermore, since a number of international 
crowd-funding platforms are planning to enter the German crowd-funding market, it would be inter-
esting to analyse the efect their market entry would have on the crowd-investing volume and the 
market structure, given that entry barriers seem high. German legislators could enhance the future 
market growth of crowd-investing by adapting the UK model, where for example tax incentives are 
provided to investors (Hölzner et al., 2014). Even though the German crowd-investing market is still 
relatively small it should be supported by policy-makers since it represents a promising funding 
method that could inluence entrepreneurial culture, after all, “economic success of nations world-
wide is the result of encouraging and rewarding the entrepreneurial instinct.” (Tracy, 2005).
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